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Introduction 
 
That technical innovation will deliver us not only from productive inefficiency, but also from 
injustice is a tempting thought. The idea that technology holds within it the seeds of 
emancipation stretches as far back as Aristotle, who wrote that the invention of autonomous 
machines would render class hierarchy and slavery obsolete: “...if every instrument could 
accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others...if...the shuttle would weave 
and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want 
servants, nor masters slaves” (Politics 1253b33-1254). Now, in the age of burgeoning AI, this 
sentiment seems to offer great solace indeed. 
 
But the solace is illusory. AI systems are, ultimately, yet more tools with which people can 
exercise power over each other. We can exercise our power for good or evil, to promote 
emancipation or subjugation; we can exercise it accountably or unaccountably, justly or unjustly. 
So it has always been, and the introduction of AI does nothing to change this. 
 
This entry won’t settle the question of what justice requires or of what specific political and 
social arrangements constitute injustice. It will try to clarify what political theorists and 
philosophers are talking about when they talk about justice and will highlight some ways in 
which the use of AI can implicate questions of justice. 
 
What Justice Is—And Isn’t 
 
In general terms, “justice” provides a set of standards by which to fairly adjudicate people’s 
(often competing) claims to various liberties, opportunities, resources, and modes of treatment. 
John Rawls, writing about “justice” as applied to a society’s major social and political 
institutions, says that even people who disagree about what justice requires can agree they need 
some standards to serve that function—to determine what people’s rights and duties are and how 
the benefits and burdens of living together in their society should be distributed (Rawls 1999, 5). 
 
Not all political theorists would define justice in Rawlsian terms, however. Some (e.g., Cohen 
1997) would challenge Rawls’ assumption that justice applies primarily to institutions, arguing 
that it applies equally to individuals’ everyday choices. Others (e.g., Okin 1989) would 
emphasize that justice doesn’t apply only to formal institutions, like the bodies of government, 
but also to informal institutions, like the family. Still others (e.g., Beitz 1999; Caney 2005; Ypi 
2012 and 2013) would argue that principles of justice like those Rawls envisions governing a 
single society actually apply to everyone around the globe. Nonetheless, we could interpret many 
who disagree about the precise scope or site of the requirements of justice as endorsing the more 
general idea above—that “justice” provides a set of standards by which to fairly adjudicate 
certain kinds of claims. 
 
A few other ideas about justice are also widely endorsed by political theorists, despite their 
disagreements about its specific requirements. First, justice is typically thought to be distinct 
from wellbeing. That a proposed policy would make (some) people richer or happier, for 
example, doesn’t mean it would be just; that it would make (some) people poorer or less happy 
doesn’t mean it would be unjust. Presumably, racist shopkeepers in the American Jim Crow 
South were displeased when they were legally required to integrate their businesses. Their 
displeasure, though, did nothing to diminish the fact that justice required integration.  
 
That said, some do think justice and wellbeing are connected, in that people have justice-based 
claims to a certain level of wellbeing. For example, Henry Shue (1996) argues that people have 
rights to the goods necessary for subsistence. David Miller (2007, 178-85, 207-8) argues that 
people have rights to the goods necessary for living a “minimally decent human life.” Others 
(see, e.g., Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2000 and 2003; Sen 1980) argue that justice requires 
people to have (or at least have the opportunity to develop) certain capabilities, such as the 
capability to participate on equal terms with one’s fellow citizens in democratic deliberation.  
 
Second, justice is not the same as legality. But, it’s often (though not universally) thought that if 
something is a requirement of justice, it should ideally be a legal requirement, too. Conversely, 
some argue that the limits on what behaviors we can feasibly guarantee via legal institutions 
should limit what behaviors we identify as requirements of justice. (Onora O’Neill (2005) makes 
an argument of this kind cautioning against the classification of what she sees as overly-
ambitious guarantees to high-quality healthcare as “human rights.”) 
 
Third, there is significant disagreement about what justice requires. But this does not mean there 
is no truth of the matter. People can and frequently do disagree about matters of fact. If you 
wanted to convincingly argue there was no truth about what justice required, you’d have to do 
more than show that people disagreed about what that truth was. Nonetheless, taking seriously 
the idea that people have equal moral worth, and are (therefore) equally entitled to help decide 
how their political lives are organized, means recognizing the weight of their ideas about what 
justice requires, even if we believe them to be mistaken. This, in turn, may mean limiting the 
ways in which we exercise our own political power—for example by helping establish and 
maintain political institutions that govern in response to their constituents’ input, rather than 
unilaterally imposing our own views of justice on others. 
 
All this is to say that even political theorists who disagree sharply about justice often agree that 
standards of justice (whatever the right ones are) serve an important social function: they allow 
us to fairly adjudicate certain kinds of claims. They provide moral, as distinct from legal, 
standards that tell us how people deserve to be treated—standards that can’t be reduced to 
commands to make people happier or richer. People will continue to disagree about which 
standards of justice are the right ones. But our actions and interactions, our social and political 
institutions, will inevitably reflect some ideas about justice at the expense of others. We are 
continually faced with the question of which of these ideas to privilege, and continually 
challenged to make and remake our shared practices and institutions in the service of justice. 
Few questions are as important as this one, and few challenges as urgent. 
 
Selected Questions of Justice 
 
Figuring out what justice requires necessitates answering countless smaller questions. How 
should material resources be distributed? If justice requires treating people “as equals,” what 
does this mean—should people be guaranteed equal opportunity, equal social status, equal 
wellbeing? What kind of influence should people have over their political institutions? What 
freedoms should governments guarantee to their people? These are only a few prominent 
questions about justice. I can’t hope to answer, or even state, them all here. Alternatively, I will 
highlight a few ideas about justice that are often overlooked or misunderstood in public political 
discourse, and that are especially relevant for the ethics of using AI. 
 
Institutional Discrimination and Structural Injustice 
 
Some injustices are created by the cumulative force of countless actions, each perhaps 
insignificant on its own, and none necessarily undertaken with the aim of oppressing anyone. 
The actors may have coordinated with each other in the sense of participating together in a 
shared social system—like their state’s legal system, or the global economy. But they need not 
have coordinated with each other in the sense of intentionally collaborating to advance a shared 
goal. Each may have acted independently, on her own motives and interests, unaware of the 
identities, motives, interests, or actions of the others. Nonetheless, their actions, taken together, 
can produce injustice. 
 
One example is what we might call “institutional discrimination.” Tommie Shelby (2007, 131) 
writes that institutional racism occurs “when the administration or enforcement of the rules and 
procedures of a major social institution…is regularly distorted by the racial prejudice or bias of 
those who exercise authority within the institution. Institutional racism can exist even when the 
content of the rules and procedures of an institution, when viewed in the abstract, is perfectly 
just, provided there is pervasive racial bias in the application of those rules and procedures.” 
Discrimination based on gender identity, sexual orientation, class, or religious affiliation, for 
example, could certainly be carried out in the same ways, rendering it “institutional” in Shelby’s 
sense.  
 
Perhaps we can find a way to utilize AI to combat institutional discrimination. We’ve already 
found ways to utilize AI to worsen it. Consider Amazon’s recently-developed (and then 
abandoned) resume screener, which was designed to use AI to identify the top resumes in a large 
pool (Dastin 2018). Far from eliminating human prejudices, this tool automated them. It 
systematically favored men’s over women’s resumes, apparently because the algorithms it used 
were trained on data collected from Amazon’s previous 10 years of applications—which were 
mostly from men (Dastin 2018). The automated screener favored resumes using certain words 
more often found in men’s resumes, and actually downgraded resumes that contained the word 
“women’s” (Dastin 2018). (Note, I often speak of gender in binary terms because that’s how the 
research I discuss speaks of it. However, I don’t mean to endorse a binary conception of gender. 
To the contrary—as Buolamwini and Gebru (2018, 6) also acknowledge—the reliance of (some) 
existing research on a binary conception of gender represents another way in which dominant 
frames of thought can exclude.) 
 
Assuming the training data was disproportionately male at least partly because of past 
unfairness—patriarchal norms discouraging women from working outside the home, popular 
sentiment that women weren’t qualified to work in technical fields, unequal educational 
opportunities for women in computer science, etc.—the algorithm’s reliance on this data is 
especially troubling. If used on real applications, Amazon’s resume screener would ensure these 
historically-common forms of discrimination continued to disempower women: though women 
wouldn’t be disallowed from applying to Amazon, their applications would be put at a 
significant disadvantage because of the biased system used to evaluate them. 
 
We may also see such bias as contributing to what Iris Marion Young (2006; 2011) calls 
“structural injustice.” According to Young (2006), different people occupy different positions 
within “social structures” (e.g., markets in certain goods and services), each position with its 
concomitant expectations, opportunities, advantages, and disadvantages. Social structures 
become sites of injustice when they systematically empower people in some positions while (and 
by) disempowering people others (Young 2006)—as, for example, men in a labor market using 
Amazon’s resume screener would be systematically empowered because women were 
systematically disempowered. Moreover, Young (2006) argues that, by participating in a given 
social structure, we help perpetuate it; therefore, we are responsible for any injustice it creates. 
 
Young’s theory may also help us understand the gravity of Google’s AI-powered photo sorter 
mis-identifying photos of black people as photos of “gorillas” (BBC 2015). The moral problem 
with this photo sorter is not (only) that its use would provoke offense, but that it would reinforce 
a mis-characterization of people of color (as less-than-human, or at least as less exemplary 
humans than white people) that’s been invoked throughout history to justify horrific injustices 
like colonialism and slavery. Moreover, we have reason to believe that our present-day social 
structures bear the marks of these past injustices. For example, Anghie (2006) and Mutua (2000) 
argue that colonialism’s central ideas and political objectives heavily influenced the development 
of international law and continue to structure global politics. If this is right, when we design and 
use technology that reflects and reinforces the central ideas and expectations underpinning these 
unjust structures, we perpetuate them and their constitutive injustice. 
 
Epistemic Injustice 
 
Miranda Fricker (2007, 1) defines epistemic injustice as an injustice “done to someone 
specifically in their capacity as a knower.” More precisely, someone suffers “testimonial 
injustice” when others discount her credibility because of some prejudice (perhaps against her 
race or gender); and someone suffers “hermeneutical injustice” when “a gap in collective 
interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of 
their social experiences” (as, for example, women struggled to understand their own experiences 
of what we now call sexual harassment before this concept was developed) (Fricker 2007, 1). 
Further, hermeneutical injustice can result from what Fricker calls “hermeneutical 
marginalization”—when certain people are excluded from the collective processes by which a 
society constructs the concepts necessary to interpret “some significant area(s) of social 
experience” (2007, 153). 
 
The use of AI clearly implicates questions of epistemic (in)justice. Consider, again, Amazon’s 
abandoned resume screener. It was trained on data representing members of a certain social 
group (men) to the exclusion of others (women). As a result, the AI system “learned” that what it 
meant to “have a good resume” was to “have a resume that looked like the resumes of previously 
successful men.” In addition to perpetuating structural injustice, as outlined above, a society that 
adopted this system might begin to see this equation of being “good” or “qualified” with “being 
like previously successful men” as an objective truth. This could encourage testimonial injustice 
by creating (or reinforcing) the impression that women are not “good” or “qualified” by the 
standards of the tech industry, thereby undermining their credibility in that field—and perhaps in 
society more broadly, given the generally high esteem given to people deemed to have 
impressive technical skills. Moreover, if dominant ideas about what it means to be “good” or 
“qualified” are constructed on the basis of men’s data, to the exclusion of women’s, this is 
arguably an instance of hermeneutical marginalization. 
 
Similarly, Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) evaluate three commercial programs that use machine-
learning-based facial recognition software to classify images as “male” or “female.” They find 
that these programs’ accuracy varies substantially based on the gender and skin tone of the 
subjects being classified (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018). All three programs perform better on 
males than females and on lighter-skinned rather than darker-skinned people, and all perform 
worst on darker-skinned females (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018, 8).  
 
This implicates questions of epistemic justice, because a society that relied heavily on the 
programs Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) discuss might come to identify looking “like a man” 
with looking like a white man. Certain ideas about what constituted a “masculine” trait (ideas 
that reflected the typical appearance of white men) could become generally accepted as “true,” to 
the exclusion of alternative ideas (that might better reflect the typical appearance of men of 
color). Men of color might be seen (and made to see themselves) as deficient members of their 
gender; they may not match what their society has adopted as the paradigmatic picture of “man,” 
because this picture was drawn to match the specifications of white men.  
 
Again, this phenomenon could contribute to both kinds of epistemic injustice Fricker identifies: 
the testimony of men of color about their own gender identity or gender presentation may be 
discounted (testimonial injustice), and they may be denied a significant role in developing their 
society’s collective understanding of what it means to look like or be a man (hermeneutical 
marginalization). 
 
Moreover, given its relative inaccuracy when identifying women, people of color, and young 
people, law enforcement’s use of facial recognition software could engender new kinds of 
discrimination against these demographic groups unknown to others (Buolamwini and Gebru 
2018, 1-3). As Buolamwini and Gebru (2018, 1) speculate, “someone could be wrongfully 
accused of a crime based on erroneous but confident misidentification of the perpetrator from 
security video footage analysis.” If women, people of color, and young people were 
systematically more vulnerable than others to such false accusations, this would arguably be an 
example of structural injustice as Young understands it. Further, in a society in which these 
groups are already denied credibility or hermeneutically marginalized, the general public may be 
ill-suited to generate the conceptual resources necessary to understand this new form of 
discrimination, what makes it wrong, and what harms it causes, thereby furthering their 
hermeneutical marginalization. 
 
Conclusions: AI as a Conduit for Human Power 
 
The choice to delegate certain tasks to AI systems is sometimes described as a choice to take 
power out of human hands. But this, I propose, is a big mistake. If someone is denied a job 
because an AI system deems her resume inadequate, we’d be wrong to say she is subject “only” 
to the power of the AI system, or of its constituent algorithms, and not to the power of any 
human being. She is of course subject to the power of human beings—the people who wrote the 
code on which the AI system ran, the people on whose data the system’s algorithms were trained, 
and the people who decided her resume would be evaluated by this particular AI system in the 
first place.  
 
Some of this human power may have been exerted unwittingly. For example, those whose data 
was used to train the algorithm may not have known they were providing data for that purpose, 
or had a realistic opportunity to opt-out. (Though the fact that some people routinely harvest 
others’ data without their genuine, informed consent itself results from human-created 
institutions and power structures.) And perhaps no one involved intended the specific outcome 
their collective action produced—to reject this particular candidate, or to discriminate against 
women candidates generally. Nonetheless, these human’s actions, taken together, produced these 
outcomes. And, certainly, the decision to use AI to screen resumes was a human decision for 
which people should be held morally (if not politically or legally) accountable. Similarly, we’d 
be remiss to see the use of AI in law enforcement, state surveillance, or the targeting systems of 
autonomous weapons as anything but a particular way for some people to exert power over 
others. In these cases, human power may operate through a computer program, but it is a 
computer program written by humans, trained on human-created data, and put to work by some 
humans to monitor, regulate, control, and even exterminate others. 
 
I don’t mean to suggest that AI can never be a force for good. My point is that once we recognize 
it is a tool with which humans exercise power, rather than a replacement for human power, we 
must also recognize that its use raises questions of justice, as any other exercise of human power 
would. It is our responsibility as consumers, programmers, researchers, and people whose data 
are used to build AI systems to make sure these questions don’t go unanswered.  
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